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In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can affect successive markets, when uncertainty 
can jointly influence both the upstream and downstream markets' conditions. The main result 
of the paper is that the equilibrium input and output quantities under stochastic dependence 
can be higher or lower than the corresponding quantities in the case of certainty equivalence 
depending on how much dependent are the events. 
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In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a⁄ect successive markets, when
uncertainty can jointly in￿ uence both the upstream and downstream markets￿
conditions. Generally, shocks a⁄ecting the economic environment in￿ uence si-
multaneously most markets in the same chain of value, and not each of them
separately. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, most existing studies in microeco-
nomics, consider that uncertainty a⁄ects just one market in isolation (Sandmo
1971, Leland 1972, Sheshinski and Dreze 1976, Gabszewicz and Poddar 1997,
Maskin 1999, Grimm and Zoettl 2006, among others), excluding thereby that
the spillovers resulting from uncertainty might be transferred from market to
market in the same chain1. These spillovers follow from the technological link-
age between ￿rms producing the input and those using this input in their own
production process.
An example of the chain e⁄ects which can occur when uncertainty a⁄ects
more than one market is provided by a consumption product the demand of
which would be high, whatever the price, when the weather is good and low in
the opposite case. Moreover, assume that simultaneously, the resource needed
to produce that good would be scarce if weather is bad, and abundant in the
opposite case. Then good weather simultaneously leads to high output demand
function and abundant resources so that restricting the analysis to the down-
stream market only, does not take into account the e⁄ect of weather on the
upstream market.
We analyse uncertainty in successive markets using a microeconomic set up.
To this end, we ￿rst introduce a simple model to describe how a downstream
￿rm and an upstream ￿rm interact in a deterministic environment. Then, we
introduce uncertainty on output demand function in the downstream market
and, as a consequence, on the demand function for input in the upstream mar-
ket. Furthermore, we assume that the cost function for producing the input is
also uncertain. We consider two cases: stochastic independence and stochastic
dependence.
We ￿nd that if shocks a⁄ecting di⁄erent markets are dependent, the equi-
librium quantity in both downstream and upstream markets under stochastic
dependence, is higher or smaller than the equilibrium quantity under certainty
equivalence (or stochastic independence) according to the degree of stochastic
dependence between the two random variables, namely output demand function
and input cost function.
The e⁄ect of uncertainty on output demand has been extensively questioned
in the existing literature. It is shown in a number of papers (e.g. Sandmo,
1971, Leland, 1972) that ￿rm￿ s attitude to bear the inherent risk of production
has important e⁄ects on the ￿rm￿ s willingness to produce, i.e. on its choice of
optimal level of production. Uncertainty places a crucial role on the pro￿tability
of entry of new ￿rms in a market and on how much capacity to build to deter
1These frequent and, quite often, unpredictable shocks can a⁄ect not only a sector but
even the economy as a whole. Of course, the study of this more general case would require a
general equilibrium approach.
2entry by the incumbent ￿rms (Gabszewicz and Poddar, 1997, Maskin, 1999).
Sheshinski and Dreze (1976) analyse uncertainty on output demand in a single
commodity competitive market and zero price elasticity demand. These authors
￿nd that free entry and competition may lead to excess capacity on the average
and that the price is lower than the minimum average cost.
2 The model
Consider a monopoly ￿rm who faces an uncertain output demand function p(q);
twice di⁄erentiable with p0(q) < 0 and p00(q) < 0, which is
p(q) =
￿
p+(q) with probability ￿
p￿(q) with probability 1 ￿ ￿
with ￿ denoting the probability of getting a high demand function. We assume
that p+(q) = p(q) + ￿; while p￿(q) = p(q) ￿ ￿; ￿ > 0;p(q) ￿ ￿ ￿ 0; 8q: Thus,
the output demand function p(q) is a random variable with two values. The
downstream monopoly uses the input z to produce the output using a linear
technology f(z) = ￿z, ￿ > 0. This input z is produced by a monopoly upstream




c+(z) with probability ￿
c￿(z) with probability 1 ￿ ￿:
where, for 8z;c+(z) > c￿(z):Thus, the input cost function c(z) is a random
variable with two values. Further, we use the simplifying assumption :
c+
0
(z) = c￿0(z) = c0(z):
It follows that the set of possible states of nature reduces to four elements,
namely:
a- both the output demand function and the cost function of producing input
are high;
b- the output demand function is high and the cost function of producing
input is low;
c- the output demand function is low and the cost function of producing
input is high;
d- both the output demand function and the cost function of producing
input are low.
3 Certainty equivalent
In the certainty equivalent scenario, output demand is deterministic and equal to
its actuarial value, namely ￿p+(q)+(1￿￿)p￿(q) = p(q)￿￿ (1 ￿ 2￿): Similarly,
the cost function of the upstream monopolist is deterministic and equal to its
3actuarial value, namely ￿c+(z)+(1￿ ￿)c￿(z): Denote by r the input price: Thus,
the pro￿t of the downstream monopolist in this case is equal to




The ￿rst order condition of the downstream monopolist writes as:
dp(q)
dq




Taking into account the linearity of the production function, (2) can be reex-





￿z + p(￿z) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)
￿
￿: (3)
The pro￿t ￿(z) of the upstream ￿rm writes as
￿(z) = r(z)z ￿ (￿c+(z) + (1 ￿ ￿)c￿(z)):
Consequently, using the ￿rst order condition for pro￿t maximization,
r(z) + r0(z)z ￿ ￿c+0(z) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c￿0(z) = 0;
we implicitly obtain the input supply function s(z): Applying the input market
clearing condition, we get r(z￿) = s(z￿); where z￿ is the equilibrium input









￿c+(z) + (1 ￿ ￿)c￿(z)
￿
Using the simplifying assumption c+
0
(z) = c￿0(z) = c0(z); the ￿rst order condi-
tion for pro￿t maximization writes as
￿
d2p(￿z)










￿z + (p(￿z) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿))
￿
￿ ￿ c0(z) = 0;
while the second order condition obtains as
￿
d3p(￿z)













Since c"(z) < 0; the pro￿t of the upstream monopolist is concave if the demand
for input faced by this ￿rm is concave. Furthermore, concavity of input demand
obtains from the following condition on output demand :
4￿
d3p(q)





Consequently, when (4) holds, the solution given by the FOC exists and is
interior. It is shown in the appendix that condition (4) is satis￿ed in the example
p(q) = 1 + ￿ ￿ q3 with probability ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q3 with probability 1 ￿ ￿:
4 Uncertainty
Assume now that both the downstream and the upstream ￿rms know the dis-
tribution probability on output demand. Furthermore assume that the down-
stream ￿rm behaves as a price taker in the input market. In other words, we
assume that the upstream ￿rm is aware of the e⁄ect of uncertainty on output
demand, while the downstream ￿rm ignores the e⁄ect of this uncertainty on the
input price2. Finally, the upstream ￿rm is assumed to know the probability
distribution of its own production cost function.
We consider now the consequences of this uncertain environment on the mar-
ket solution in two di⁄erent scenarios: stochastic independent, and stochastic
dependent, events.
4.1 Stochastic independence
Under stochastic independence, the states of nature a, b, c and d occur with
probability ￿￿;￿(1￿￿);(1￿￿)￿;(1￿￿)(1￿￿); respectively: The expected pro￿ts

























which can be rewritten as
E￿(q;r) =
h













Comparing the objective functions (1) and (5), we see that the output quantities
maximizing pro￿ts of the downstream monopolist coincide in both cases.
Since the objective function of the downstream monopolist under stochastic
independence is the same as in the case of certainty equivalent, the input de-
mand is also the same in both cases. Therefore, the objective function for the
upstream monopoly under stochastic independence is also the same as in the
certainty equivalence scenario. Hence, the market solution under independent
stochastic uncertainty coincides with the market solution which appears in the
case of certainty equivalence.
2This assumption is in the spirit of the traditional framework of successive markets where
it is assumed that the downstream ￿rm(s) take the input price as given (Salinger 1988, Gaudet
and Von Long 1996...).
54.2 Stochastic dependence
Consider now the case of stochastic dependence. We keep the assumption that
the downstream ￿rm does not know the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the input price
and, accordingly, takes the input price as given whatever the state. Further-
more, for sake of simplicity, we assume that Pr(high output demand p low input
marginal cost ) = Pr(low output demand p high input marginal cost ) = ￿: Hence
the states of nature a, b, c and d now occur each with probabilities
a : Pr(high output demand \ low input marginal cost ) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿);
b : Pr(low output demand \ low input marginal cost ) = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿);
c : Pr(low output demand \ high input marginal cost ) = ￿￿;
d : Pr(high output demand \ high input marginal cost) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
Then, the expected pro￿t function of the downstream ￿rm writes as
E￿(q;r) =
￿






De￿ne ￿ as the probability to have a high output demand function under sto-
chastic dependence, namely ￿ = ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿; with 0 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿ ￿ 1; or
￿
1￿2￿ ￿ ￿: Then the expected pro￿t obtains as
E￿(q;r) =
￿






Since the objective function (5) is the same as (6), except that the probability
of high demand is now given by ￿ and the probability of low demand is 1 ￿ ￿;
the input demand is similar to the input demand under stochastic independence
with these corresponding probabilities. Hence, following the same procedure as
in the case of certainty equivalent case, we obtain the market solution from the
￿rst order condition of (5) :
￿
d2p(￿z)










￿z + (p(￿z) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿))
￿
￿ ￿ c0(z) = 0:
Thus, we ￿nally obtain
Proposition 1 The output and input quantities produced at equilibrium under
stochastic dependence are respectively higher equal or lower than the quantities
produced under certainty equivalence (or stochastic independence), if and only if
the probability ￿ of a high output demand function, under certainty equivalence,
is higher, equal or lower, than the corresponding probability ￿ under stochastic
dependence.
6Notice that @￿
@￿ 7 0 i⁄ ￿ ? 1
2: Thus, the probability of having a high output
demand function (resp. output quantity) increases with the probability of high
input cost function (resp. input quantity), when the probability of high output
demand conditional on low input marginal cost does not exceed 1
2.
As for the prices, notice that both the output and input prices under sto-
chastic dependence can be either higher equal or lower than the price under
certainty equivalence (or stochastic independence). Of course, if ￿ is higher
than ￿; then the demand functions both in the downstream and upstream mar-
kets shift upwards. However, the intersection with the quantity chosen by the
monopolist in its own market does not allow to conclude about the sign of the
change in the corresponding price.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a⁄ect successive markets when
uncertainty can jointly in￿ uence both the upstream and downstream markets￿
conditions. Our main interest is to analyse the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the
production choice of the upstream and the downstream ￿rm, when uncertainty
in each market originates from stochastic independent and/or dependent events.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, it
provides a microeconomic framework to deal with uncertainty when it a⁄ects
di⁄erent markets belonging to the same chain of value. On the other hand, it
analyses how these combined sources of uncertainty can a⁄ect the production
choices of a downstream and upstream ￿rm in a bilateral monopoly situation. A
natural extension of the present paper would be to analyse successive oligopolies
and, as a byproduct, how uncertainty can in￿ uence the pro￿tability of vertical
integration and horizontal mergers.
5.1 Appendix
Condition (4) is satis￿ed in the example p(q) = 1 + ￿ ￿ q3 with probabil-
ity ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q3 with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Consider a downstream mo-
nopolist facing this random demand function and that its technology is de-
￿ned by f(z) = z: Maximizing the pro￿t ￿(q) in the certainty equivalent case,
￿(q) =
￿
(￿(1 ￿ q3 + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q3 ￿ ￿))q ￿ rq
￿




4 (￿ (2￿ ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ r)): The upstream monopolist faces the above input de-
mand and assume that he faces,a linear stochastic production cost c(z), equal to
￿
+z with probability ￿ and ￿
￿z with probability 1￿￿: Taking into account the
equality of demand and supply, i.e. r(z) = s(z), in the upstream market, we get
r(z) = ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)￿4z3+1. Accordingly, the pro￿t function of the upstream mo-
nopolist writes as ￿(z) =
￿
2￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4z3 + 1
￿
z￿￿z; with ￿ = ￿￿
++(1￿￿)￿
￿:




16 (2￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + 1): Substituting z in r, we obtain r￿ =
￿￿3￿+6￿￿+3
4 : Fi-
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